Harriman did not attend the Churchill-Stalin summit in Moscow, but he did his best to keep Roosevelt informed of what was discussed, although he did not mention percentages.  Harriman`s information on the Anglo-Soviet summit was generally accurate, although the Churchill-Stalin talks, which he did not know existed, were generally accurate.  Over the next few months, Roosevelt did not welcome the full content of the Moscow summit and the percentage agreement.  According to Melvyn Leffler, Churchill sought to “abolish” the percentage agreement after the end of the world war and the visit of Greece.  This was particularly the case, with Churchill and Roosevelt keeping such discretion over the agreement that their successors in power did not know it. Meanwhile, Stalin initially believed that the secret agreement was more important than Yalta`s public agreement, which led to his perception of betrayal and the growing urgency to secure friendly governments on the ussr`s border.  Although Yugoslavia was not considered as important as Italy and Greece, Churchill had insisted in June 1944 that a coalition government merge the provisional government of federal democratic Yugoslavia in 1943 with the Yugoslav government in exile, led by King Peter II, proclaimed by Marshal Josip Broz Tito in 1943.  Churchill hoped that with Stalin`s help he could convince Tito to accept King Peter II, believing that maintaining the Karasoor-Evia house would ensure that Yugoslavia remained at least partially within the British sphere of influence after the war.  However, unlike Greece and Italy, where British ships along the Suez Canal route had to pass, this was not the case for Yugoslavia, which led Churchill to give less importance to this nation. With regard to Greece, British policy, as contained in an internal document, “our long-term policy towards Greece is to keep it within the British sphere of influence and… A Russian-dominated Greece would not correspond to the British strategy in the eastern Mediterranean.  British policy knew that the main resilience force in Greece was the EAM (Ethnika Apeleftherotik-Metopotik-National De Libération), British policy was to support the EAM to bind German forces that might otherwise fight the British, while preventing the EAM from coming to power and ensuring that the Greek government, with its headquarters in Cairo, returned to Greece.  Given Churchill`s importance to Greece, he absolutely wanted an agreement with Stalin that Moscow would accept Greece as part of the British sphere of influence.  On May 4, 1944, Churchill asked his foreign minister, Anthony Eden, the rhetorical question: “Will we agree with the communitarianization of the Balkans and perhaps Italy?”  Churchill answered his own question by saying that Britain must “resist communist infusion and invasion.”  The attempt to gain spheres of influence for the Balkans has led Gusev to question whether the Americans would be involved.
 Eden assured Gusev that the Americans would support the spheres of influence of the agreement, but on request, the State Department responded firmly that it was not the policy of the United States to conclude such agreements as would violate the Atlantic Charter.  Churchill found himself in a difficult situation and spoke directly to Roosevelt. British historian David Carlton recounts that during the Second World War, Winston Churchill painfully realized that Britain had spent its capital during the war and that it was economically dependent on American support. Although Churchill wanted Britain to continue as a world power after the war, he was aware that the Soviet Union would be a much stronger power in a post-war world than before the war, while Britain would be a much weaker power than before the war.  At the same time, Churchill feared that the United States would return to isolationism after the war, thus facing a Britain that was more or less economically weakened by the Soviet Union
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